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Abstract. Crowdsourcing human-solving or online typing attacks are de-
structive problems. However, studies into these topics have been limited. In
this paper, we focus on this kind of attacks whereby all the CAPTCHAs can
be simply broken because of its design purpose. After pursuing a compre-
hensive analysis of the Typer phenomenon and the attacking mechanism of
CAPTCHA, we present a new CAPTCHA design principle to distinguish
human (Typer) from human (user). The core idea is that the challenge
process of the CAPTCHA should contain the unique information with a
private attribute. The notion of our idea is based on the information asym-
metry between humans. Without this private information, Typers will not
be able to finish the attack even if they recognize all the characters from
the CAPTCHA.
We formalize, design and implement two examples on our proposed prin-
ciple, a character-based, and a datagram-based case, according to a web
interaction and password handling program. We challenge the user to se-
lect the password from the random characters that are not in the password
sequence or to place the randomly sorted sequences into the correct order.
A novel generation algorithm with a fuzzy matching method has been pro-
posed to add the capability of human error tolerance and the difficulty of
random guess attack. Unlike other solutions, our approach does not need to
modify the primary authentication protocol, user interface, and experience
of the typical web service. The several user studies’ results indicate that
our proposed method is both simple (can be solved by humans accurately
within less than 20 seconds) and efficient (the Typer can only deploy a
random guess attack with a very low success rate).
1 Introduction
Since the concept was first introduced by Von Ahn [19], researchers develop a
wide variety of CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart). Nowadays, all techniques developed for generating
CAPTCHA rely on the information that is known to the server but not to the
user. The consequence of such information asymmetry is the user can only pass
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the Turing test by solving a hard AI problem. The information to be challenged
thus is limited to random letters, such as Handwritten [17] and reCaptcha [21].
Besides, the information can also be designed with high-entropy entries that need
humans cognitive or interactive ability, such as Asirra [5], ESP-PIX [20], Google
image orientation [8], and Sketcha [16].
However, the design purpose of the CAPTCHA, easy for a human but hard for
robots, has also been utilized by some parties to outsource the recognition piece-
meal to the unskilled labor pools. The attackers can decode the CAPTCHA by
simply relaying the recognition processes to human solvers (be referred to as the
Typer). Unfortunately, to date, most of the existing methods cannot completely
solve the Typer problem. In this paper, we present a new direction for avoiding
crowdsourcing Typers cheating on CAPTCHA. We introduce the private informa-
tion to get the asymmetry and break the same verification connection between the
attackers and the Typers. Based on the commonly used password transmission
process, we introduce a user study to demonstrate our principle, and it shares the
common principle on user’s identity verification. That is, the private information
(i.e., the password) we embedded must come from the user’s HTTP POST [23]
to ensure that the verification process and the CAPTCHA challenge implements
simultaneously.
Unlike other solutions, our approach does not need to modify the basic authen-
tication protocol, user interface, or experience of the common web service. Also,
the method covers most of the daily web application scenarios like registration or
certificate identification. The results of several user studies and experiments indi-
cate that our proposed method is simple and effective. No matter what kind of
counter attacks (fake accounts, compromised accounts or password changing), the
Typer can only deploy a random guess attack with a very low success rate, while
a legitimate user can solve the CAPTCHA accurately within less than 10 seconds.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
– We conduct an in-depth study and analysis of the online CAPTCHA typing
jobs and the Typer phenomenon.
– We propose a new principle for prohibition of the Typers cheating.
– We create two demonstration examples of our method which can be utilized
in the real scenarios.
– We devise a generation algorithm to add the capability of human error toler-
ance and the difficulty of random guess attacks.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Human Solver and Online CAPTCHA Typing Jobs
CAPTCHA should be simple and easy to be solved by humans on its original
design. Therefore, their validation can be entirely sidestepped by outsourcing the
task to human labor pools on a “for hire” basis (or opportunistically [19]). Nowa-
days, the emergence of new technologies, like reCaptcha [21], deepCaptcha [15],
and rtCaptcha [18], make it hard to automate the recognition of a CAPTCHA by
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Fig. 1: The interface of the crowdsourcing CAPTCHA typing work. It contains
web-based entry form or mobile version. And the right is the RuCaptcha software
which the newest version has already supported the Google’s reCaptcha [21].
robots. However, the CAPTCHA entry work, which only requires human labors’
typing skills, is easy for the human labors who are referred as the CAPTCHA
Typers. Figure 1 shows the interface of the Typers’ entry work. Marti Motoyama
et al. have analyzed this problem in 2010 [13]. Since then, such advertisements have
increased significantly on “work-for-hire” sites (labor market) such as upwork.com
and zbj.com. After that, to automate the real-time solving of CAPTCHA, com-
mercial malware industry setups a series of web services, which consist of the
customer’s front-end programs and the Typer’s back-end programs.
The customer’s front-end programs, like 2captcha.com, De-Captcher.com and
Antigate.com, are the CAPTCHA solving sites that the malware industry pro-
vides real-time CAPTCHA-to-text decoding services. And the Typer back end,
like 2captcha.com (It both has the front end and back end service), Kolotibablo,
Dama2 and PixProfit, are the malicious crowdsourcing sites that pay the human
labors to perform the CAPTCHA entry works.
The example in Figure 2 illustrates a typical workflow of the CAPTCHA typing
jobs and the relationships among the participants involved in the attacker and
the Typer. Here we take the credential stuffing attack as an example. When the
attacker attempts to hijack an existing account and accomplishes account takeover
through automated web injection, a CAPTCHA will challenge them 1 . After the
attacker uploads the CAPTCHA to the customer (attacker) front-end API 2 ,
the front end server queues the CAPTCHA to be solved on the (Typer) back end
server 3 . The back end then directly distributes the task 4 , or in a form of
a data-entry job on labor market sites 5 6 , to a random Typer to obscure the
login information. Then the Typer enters a result and the web service on the front
end returns it to the API 7 - 9 . The attacker packages the account information
with the recognition CAPTCHA texts. And in the end, the attacker finishes the
web injection after sending the HTTP POST packages 10 .
3
Typer back end server Typer
Customer(attacker)¬
front end server
Attacker
(Malicious industry)
Labor
Market
Fig. 2: Workflow of the online CAPTCHA typing jobs
2.2 Solutions to the Typer Problems
The process of solving the Typer problem, also known as the “relay attacks” or
the “3rd party human attack” problem, is to find a way of avoiding all crowd-
sourcing human cheating on CAPTCHA. Due to the simplicity, high success rate
and low economic costs (usually less than one dollar per thousand CAPTCHAs),
this problem is much more feasible in practice than machine vision or other auto-
mated attacks [13][7]. The attacker only needs to simply forward the CAPTCHA
to the human solvers, who type the challenge characters and wait for the Typers’
response. Similarly, the video-based CAPTCHAs [24] are straightforward as well
by forwarding the video file or sending enough snapshots to the human solver.
Unfortunately, to date, there is no particularly effective solution to overcome
this problem. Here we distinguish three main techniques that focus on how to
design new CAPTCHAs to avoid the Typer problem: One way is to set a “per-
character-response time” for solving the CAPTCHA. A detailed analysis of the
reaction time suggests that the Typer can improve the success rate and the re-
sponse speed through a series of training [12]. Meanwhile, the most commonly
encountered distortions of the CAPTCHA can also severely degrade human us-
ability [2].
Another approach is the user-interaction based CAPTCHA. It queries users to
perform specific tasks, which are impossible for the artificial intelligence and relies
on the stream interactions that a user performs while responses the CAPTCHA
challenge. Ye et al. have developed an improved method, named DDIM (Drag-n-
Drop Interactive Masking), applies drag-n-drop and masking scheme to distinguish
the legitimate user from the Typers and robots [25]. Game CAPTCHA is an in-
teresting example that challenges the user to execute a game-like cognitive action
interacting with a series of images. Mohamed et al. [12, 11] have studied the per-
formance of game-play behavioral features under the stream-based relay attacks
which means the attacker can synchronously relay the data stream from the server
over to a human solver, Typer, and then relay back with the response to the server.
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The results demonstrate that the Dynamic Cognitive Game (DCG) CAPTCHA
offers some level of resistance to relay attacks. However, increasing the size of the
game, the interaction between the user and the server not only improves the ability
to resist the relay attack but also introduces complex operations that make users
feel bored. And the simplicity of the underlying cognitive task cannot provide
sufficient protection capability.
The use of information asymmetry is the third approach. It introduces unique
information into in the CAPTCHA challenge process. This information can be pur-
chase records, the people you familiar with, a geographical location [22], Multiple
Factors Authentication (MFA) information or different data that exists on the lo-
gin page but outside the CAPTCHA itself [9]. But if the information does not have
the private attribute, it can also be shared with the Typer because doing so is no
threat to the account security. MFA, as it is commonly abbreviated, is a method
of computer access control that adds extra channels to the basic authentication
process. The most widely used channel of this form is the mobile phone. In this
way, the clients can use a one-time-valid passcode, that is sent to user’s mobile by
SMS, in addition to their identities. This randomly generated passcode can be sent
to user’s mobile by SMS. Hence, the passcode can be seen as the CAPTCHA that
the Typers cannot obtain directly. However, the emergence of shared line appear-
ance (SLA) enables the attacker to configure a group of multiple mobiles that can
each receive the SMS to a shared phone number. With the help of this technology,
the malware industry has taken full advantage of the Online-SMS-receive services,
like twilio.com, receive-sms-online.com or shou-ma.com, to receive the inbound
messages that contain the verification code from applications’ login requests, such
as Facebook, Whatsapp, Yahoo, WeChat and so on. Thus, this method cannot
completely solve the Typer problem.
3 Architecture and Methodology
3.1 Principle
The key problem with the current way of preventing automated posting and login
lies in the way how the tests are designed fundamentally. Today, all approaches are
based on the Turing test of proving if a user is a human or bot. The main failure
of this architecture is that the Turing test can only be used to distinguish between
a conscious man and an unconscious machine. The test questions are randomly
generated and independent of context. It cannot distinguish a human from another,
that is, a Typer from a legitimate user. Having exploited this vulnerability, the
attackers can bypass the CAPTCHAs via the Typers when the vision solving
algorithms fail.
To enable the CAPTCHA to distinguish a human (user) from another hu-
man (Typer), we should find the differences between them first. According to the
analysis in Section II, the only way to solve this problem is to make the use of in-
formation asymmetry in a real-time scenario. The notion of our idea is simple but
generic. If we can add unique information to the process, Typers will not be able
to finish the recognition task if they do not know the data which is only shared by
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the user with the server. That is, we break the relationship between the attacker
and the Typer with this unique information. By following this notion, we need to
ensure that the attacker is not willing to share this information with the Typer
or the attacker can not share the fake information with the Typer. Hence, the in-
tuition behind our proposed method is that: We embed the process of users’
private data verification into the process of CAPTCHA challenge.
Specifically, first, different users should share different information with the
server. Second, the challenge processes should include and utilize this information.
And third, for safety reasons, the challenge data should come from the users’ sub-
mission instead of the servers’ storage. We generate the CAPTCHA by attaching
the private information that is submitted by the users. Meanwhile, the private at-
tribute means they will not share the information with Typer. Afterwards, Typers
cannot finish the job because they need to answer the questions with the private
information included in the CAPTCHA.
3.2 Web Interaction Design and Case Study
According to the commonly used processing method of password transmission,
in the course of our work, we present an example algorithms as a case study to
demonstrate our principle. The algorithm shares a common principle, and that is,
we embed the private information (i.e., password, password hash or other privacy
preserved information) into the Turing test to setup the information asymmetry,
and this knowledge should come from the user’s POST requests or submissions
(cleartext, ciphertext or other forms) rather than from the system’s database stor-
age.
Case I: Character-based Example According to the web interaction design,
in most scenes, the webserver can get the plaintext content of the users’ POST.
Hence, the generation process of the CAPTCHA closely links to the character
handling. For this case, a CAPTCHA is a sequence of random alphanumerical
characters with the secret knowledge (password) provided by the user. A typi-
cal way to apply our proposed principle in user authentication is as follows. The
webserver WS stores a per-user salt su mixed in with the salted-password hash
hu = H(su ·pu) for each UserID, where pu stands for the user’s cleartext password.
Upon receiving a login request, WS sends the login page response to the client.
Once the end-user transmits the UserID and password p′u, the WS generates the
CAPTCHA by utilizing these credentials and sends the image to the user to click.
After the user’s clicks are recorded and sent, the WS receives and analyzes these
corresponding reactions. The user authentication continues only if these clicks are
selected correctly. Otherwise, the webserver will return a failure result and inter-
rupts the following process. Afterwards, if the CAPTCHA test is passed, the WS
calculates the hash value h′u = H(su · p′u) with the salt su stored for the account,
and compares the two hashes hu and h
′
u to determine whether they are the same.
This process is called the character-based case. That is, the webserver can process
every single character of the password that the user submits in the login request.
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Server
Login Request
Login Page
UserID uid, Password¬¬p'u
1. Generate CAPTCHA by p'u
2. Query¬hu, salt su¬from DB by uid
1.CAPTCHA ? Yes:¬h'u¬= H(su¬·¬p'u)
¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬No: Failure
2.¬¬hu¬=¬ h'u¬?¬ ¬Yes:Success 
¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬No: Failure
Server
CAPTCHA Challenging
CAPTCHA Response
Success or Failure
User
User
ServerUser
Login Request
Login Page
UserID, Hash¬h'u
1. <x,y> = F(UserID, h'u)
2. Generate CAPTCHA
1. (UserID, h'u) = f<x,y>
2. hu¬=¬ h'u¬¬?¬ Yes: Success
No:¬ Failure
User Server
CAPTCHA Challenging
Response with click action
Success or Failure
Fig. 3: The sequence diagram of the authentication
The UserID and password p′u are attached to the CAPTCHA challenge processes
of this case as the private information. Figure 3 left shows the authentication
sequence of the example.
The intuitive generation algorithm is to combine part of the password with
random characters, and to ask users to select those that appear in the password.
The WS randomly and temporarily selects a certain number of letters from the
cleartext of the password when it receives the user’s credential. Meanwhile, it
combines with random characters that are not in the password sequence which
must not be clicked by the users.
Case II, Datagram-based Example More generally, besides sending the clear-
text password to the server through encrypted channels, to enhance the privacy,
clients can also verify their identities by applying a challenge-response method
to provide the secret information. Rather than merely asking for the password,
the server also produces a value that depends on it. For example, the challenge-
response protocols are designed by applying a one-way function to the passwords.
On many systems, the one-way function is applied as a cryptographic hash and
its output as a hashed password. Using hash-based challenge-response protocols
along with TLS, obviously, will provide not only a secure session but also pri-
vate protection between the user and server. However, the conflict between hash-
based authentication and the capability of processing the shared secret from the
user’s POST makes us unable to use the character-based algorithm to generate
the CAPTCHA. Hence, to extend the case I to a more general form, we employ
the datagrams, based on the user’s POST requests or information submissions, to
generate the CAPTCHA.
Taking the hash-based challenge-response authentication as an example, the
workflow of our proposed approach in the user authentication is as follows. After
receiving the login page, the end-user transmits the UserID and hashed password
h′u = H(p
′
u) to WS, where p
′
u is the password that the user submitted. Then, the
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server calculates the UserID and h′u with < x, y >= F (UserID, h
′
u) to cover the
sequence of hash to CAPTCHA and sends the image to the user as the challenge.
The processing of the Turing test is the same as the case I, and when the WS
receives the coordinates of the clicked point < x, y >, it then recovers the UserID
and hash by function (UserID, h′u) = f < x, y > and compares the result with
the hash value stored in the database. The CAPTCHA verification and the au-
thentication succeed only if the two hash values are equal. The sequence of the
datagram-based example is shown in Figure 3 right.
There are many methods for the generation of the CAPTCHA by the user’s
POST datagram. In this paper, we use the simplest algorithm to demonstrate
our principle. That is, we divide the string of the hashed password into different
blocks and then shuffle them randomly to test the users whether they can drag the
shuffled blocks in correct order. In our example, the length of the hash is 16bit,
and we split it into six parts. For simplicity of this discussion, we have employed
the click operation to place these sequences into a special order.
4 Generation Algorithm
4.1 Random Generation with Unpredictable
To increase the difficulty of random guess attacks and to introduce the level of un-
certainties, our CAPTCHA generation algorithm leverages randomized approaches
to assemble the CAPTCHAs. We randomly select the characters and then create
a stochastic sequence to ensure the results are not predictable.
For the case of character-based selection, our approach divides the candidate
subjects into two parts. It then internally labels them with the submission part
(SP) and the generation part (GP). We select the SP from the private information
shared between the server and the user (i.e., passwords). Because of the risk of
password leaks and shoulder-surfing attacks, our method does not pick all the pri-
vate information. Each time, we randomly choose some characters of the password
to be the SP, and then randomly place them among the challenge characters. For
the datagram-based case, our approach randomly splits the private information
(i.e., password hash) into different parts and shuffles them into a random order.
We then employ the clicking or dragging operation to be done by the users in the
aim of sorting the random sequence into the correct order.
4.2 Error Tolerance with High Reliability
To increase the capability of human error tolerance and also add uncertainty to
the process, we deploy a fuzzy matching method based on the users’ responses.
Since human beings may make mistakes even on the familiar things, we call these
mistakes “slight mistakes”, we fully consider this flexibility of human judgment in
the CAPTCHA solving task.
In this paper, we consider a response to be positive if a user identities 3 out
of 4 password characters correctly while selecting none of the GP. Simply treating
8
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Fig. 4: The FSM of the CAPTCHA
generation process
Fig. 5: The user interface of our proposed
method.
these slight mistakes as correct may weaken the security of web services. Besides,
if the Typer is lucky enough to pass the test with this slight error, they will use
the characters they click in the following steps. Hence, we do not think twice slight
mistakes are still insignificant. We deploy a fuzzy matching algorithm to take full
advantage of evaluating the users’ judgments. The partial credit algorithm (PCA)
is a solution to improve the CAPTCHA which scores the responses more like a
human [5]. It considers two “almost right” answers are strong evidence that the
subject is a human. Our fuzzy matching method is built on the PCA with a similar
scheme, but with the different attitude towards “almost right” or slight mistakes.
That is we build our hypothesis base on the fact that, a human may miss some
objects from the the private knowledge but never select the characters that are
not in the information.
Mathematically, we can state this relationship as follows. When the server needs
to challenge a new user, the first phase marks the user with a rejected (r) state. If
the user solves the challenge precisely, the state is then marked as successful (s).
When the user makes a slight mistake, the server marks the user with a pending
(p) state. From the pending state, only if the user completely solves the next
CAPTCHA, the pending state is changed to a successful state; or else, the state
retreats to the first phase as the rejected state. Figure 4 shows the Finite-State
Machine (FSM) diagram of the CAPTCHA generation process.
Here, we let α be the probability of solving a CAPTCHA to be completely
correct, β be the probability of making a slight mistake, and γ represent the
probability of giving a wrong response. According to the FSM, the probability of
each state is calculated as follows:
sn = α(sn−1 + pn−1 + rn−1)
pn = β(sn−1 + rn−1)
rn = βpn−1 + γ(sn−1 + pn−1 + rn−1)
α+ β + γ = 1
where s0 = 0, p0 = 0 and r0 = 0.
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5 Evaluation and analysis
5.1 Implementation
All algorithms involved in the experiment are implemented using Node.js and Mon-
goDB in the server-side. The front-end webpage development utilizes the React-
Bootstrap with the Webpack framework and a collection of hypertext markup
language (HTML). All the participants in the study are asked to try three types
of the CAPTCHAs which are the character-based case, datagram-based case and
the common text-based CAPTCHA as the baseline. We record the participants’
reactions to the challenge and examine two performance metrics, response time
and success rate, five times for each type.
To recreate the general conditions, they finish the tests using their own devices
ranging from computers, mobiles, laptops to tablets (see Figure 5). And they use
a mix of web browsers to access the experiment server. More than 270 volunteers
take part in our user studies. Experiment subjects include teachers, students, and
the employees of three colleges. Their ages range from 18 to 65, and their education
levels range from high school diploma to Ph.D.
5.2 Usability Study
In this study, We evaluate the usability of our principle based on three aspects
which are partially quoted from [14].
Learnability and Efficiency As can be seen in Figure 6, the user spends more
time in the first round. The datagram-based case takes longer than other tests
to finish for the volunteers. It costs less than 20s on average to solve the first
challenge. However, surprisingly, it is the highest accuracy test with 90% success
rate in the first round according to the Figure 7. As the participants’ experiences
built up, we can find that the response time is reduced quickly from 20s to 10s or
below after five rounds.
In Table 1, it shows the overall time and the success rate to finish the different
kinds of CAPTCHA schemes. We see that there’s no significant difference in the
accuracy. Typing text takes longer than click action. So our method spends little
time than others with similar accuracy. According to these results, both the re-
sponse time and the success rate suggest that our method is easy to learn, simple
to use, and inexpensive to implement.
Errors and Recovery After examining each challenge and the corresponding
response, we find that there are three main reasons for these errors: Some of
them were attributable to the confusion of the CAPTCHA characters. With the
limitation of the fonts that provided by the operation system, many characters, i.e.,
the number 0 and character O, are not easy to recognize. Though rare, some errors
occur because some old participants are not proficient enough with standard input
devices to interact with the CAPTCHA. When deploying the usability testing,
these old people’s mouse movements usually make mistakes such as performing a
drag action during a single-click.
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5.3 Security Study
Private Data Breach Users may think there will be a risk of password leakage.
According to our method, the real password is only used in the user authentication
interactions and does not appear at any step of the Turing test.
For the server-side, it can still hash passwords immediately to limit the ex-
posure of plaintext passwords to threats. All the challenge literal data are com-
ing from the user’s POST requests or submissions rather than from the servers’
11
Table 1: The average response time and accuracy of recognition
CAPTCHA Scheme Times(s) Accuracy(%)
Our Experiment
Character-based Example 7.51 93.6
Datagram-based Example 14.29 94.9
Baseline 12.72 85.5
Uzun et al.[18]
reCaptcha(num) 22.11 96.7
reCaptcha(phrase) 20.88 91.5
Ebay 12.33 100
Yandex 15.05 96.7
databases. Thus the password strength is not weakened. Besides, for the user-side,
the attacks may infect the process of the CAPTCHA generation by the authenti-
cation data that attackers submit. These fabricated data obtained by performing
a CAPTCHA test, hence, are not the real credentials. The adversaries cannot gain
access to the web service.
Brute Force, Random Guess and Shoulder-Surfing Attack When received
a wrong CAPTCHA response, the web server will generate a new challenge image.
Therefore, the brute force attack on the CAPTCHA is invalid under our proposed
principle. The effectiveness of the random guess attack is mainly dependent on
the success rate of the attack. According to the [3], a standard acceptable success
rate should not be higher than 0.01%. Moreover, with the token bucket scheme
proposed in [5], the tolerable success rate can be relaxed to 0.6% (TB-Refill is 3).
If we ask users to select the right answer from the eight candidate characters or
symbols in the user study and if the adversaries have no basis for selecting the
correct characters, the success rate of this attack is probably 1/28 (1/256 or less
than 0.4%).
Shoulder-surfing is a type of attack to obtain the private information, such as
passwords, by looking over the victim’s shoulder. Most password filling screens use
asterisks instead of showing characters in clear-text. If parts of the password are
shown through the CAPTCHA, it may introduce a leakage of private information.
In fact, it is not so severe as is generally assumed. First, many companies and
services now require users to meet stringent requirements for password strength
and complexity. It reduces the duplication of letters in the password and makes
more difficult to guess it by shoulder-surfing. Second, the asterisk is mainly used
to hide the context of characters rather than the characters themselves. The pri-
vate information contained in the CAPTCHA is selected randomly. It will not
reveal too much context information about the password under the circumstances
of incorrect responses. Even under the circumstance with the right CAPTCHA se-
lections, purely by shoulder-surfing, the adversaries cannot learn more about the
information such as the length of the password or the order of these characters.
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Fig. 8: The left is an example used in the non-authentication scenarios (e.g., search
engine).The middle is the calculation version. The right shows an example of map-
ping version.
6 Discussion
6.1 Application Scope.
The principle we proposed, simple but generic, can work in most web application
scenarios. If the information comes from users, it is clear that the proposed ap-
proach is suitable for the case when using CAPTCHA for authentication or the
authenticated users want to solve CAPTCHA tasks automatically (e.g., intended
to crawl some data from a site, etc.).
Besides, the CAPTCHA is widely used for non-authenticated applications like
avoiding crawlers or abuse of search engine. A striking example is as follows: when
sending searches from a robot, search scraper or using software that sends searches
to Google, the attacker might be challenged by a reCAPTCHA [21]. In this circum-
stance, there is no authentication information shared between client and server.
Following our principle, we can randomly select search histories or pages that the
user has visited as the user information and embed them into the generation pro-
cess of the CAPTCHAs. Figure 8 (left) illustrates the example used in a search
engine. If the robot (or attacker) queries the CAPTCHA challenges, the Typers
will have no idea for the words meaning unless robot packages all the search his-
tories and sends to them.
However, we note that the selection of such information is very challenging.
Moving forward, we should find more suitable information or a proper expression
(encryption) method according to the specific circumstances. Without concerning
the privacy, we can utilize the asymmetry of information costs or information
entropy. This is beyond the discussion scope of this paper. We will do more research
on how to solve the Typer problem for the non-authenticated situations in future.
6.2 Machine Vision Attacks
The two examples of our case studyare based on the hypothesis of the robust-
ness of the image CAPTCHA. If the breakthrough of the recent advancements
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in automatically solving computer vision tasks (especially the deep learning era)
leads an increasing number of CAPTCHAs to become ineffective, our method will
face the same problem. Following our principle, the characters in the CAPTCHAs
are context dependent. For Typers, even if they automate the recognition of the
CAPTCHAs, without the private information, it is also unfeasible to pass the test.
However, the Figure 5 (left bottom) shows that case II may be easily solved by
reasoning on the order of word segments or be easily attacked by matching features
(e.g., colors) of letters in the different segments. In a more realistic scenario, the
server will not offer the reference object (the hash value) to the user. More specif-
ically, users submit their username and hashed-password to the webserver. Once
the server receives the sequences, It will generate the CAPTCHAs by messing up
the order. Figure 8 (middle) shows the CAPTCHAs challenge page. The webserver
does not provide the hashed-password but the hash function. And users calculate
the reference object themselves.
6.3 Password, Graphical Password and CAPTCHA
Graphical Password is first introduced by Greg Blonder [1], may be a solution to
the Typer problem to some degree. The idea is to let the user click on several
regions in an image that appears on the screen. To log in, the user has to click
on the same areas again. We can think of this solution as a password-pad of the
e-banking system. CAPTCHA as Graphical Passwords (CaRP), proposed by Zhu
et al. [26], is a particular case of the clicking-based graphical password. Hence, it
functions as both the graphical password and the CAPTCHA.
Some people may think separating one human from another is done via pass-
words. However, passwords and CAPTCHAs have entirely different design pur-
poses. By combining the graphical password and the CAPTCHA into a single
entity, CaRP changes the login application flow and the basic authentication in-
frastructure. The application flexibility, password strength, and the system security
performance are questionable in its case, too.
On the other hand, CaRP can be seen as a kind of a particular case of password
mapping. The datagram contains the information that defines the relationships be-
tween the user clicks and the passwords that the verification process needs. Like
our proposed principle, CaRP introduces the password, as the shared private in-
formation, into the challenge process. The password can be recovered from the
received coordinates which are packaged in the datagram. We think of this process
as a password mapping. But our approach does not modify the existing authen-
tication framework nor does it reduce the strength of the password, and we can
expand the range of applications to solve the non-authenticated situation.
6.4 Guide for the Future CAPTCHA Design
The operation of the datagram-based example is very complicated and hard to use.
We should map the data to a proper representation space. Here we give an example
of a friendly mapping approach to the web interface design industry. As shown in
the Figure 8 (right), the webserver separates the hash into six parts and maps them
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as six different random animals. The users calculate their private information to
get the correct reference object and sort cute animals into the correct order.
The most suitable information to share should be selective, and relatively sim-
ple and easy to maintain. For example, we can use the SSNs (Social Security
numbers), user passwords or password hashes as this alternative knowledge. The
attackers will not share the password or other login information with Typers to
avoid them stealing these accounts. So we select the password (or hash) in the
methodology as the example to demonstrate our principle. Following this princi-
ple, We neither store the data (the user uses to verify their password) submitted
by the user nor reduce the security of the authentication scheme. The password
(or hash) should be the first option in a web application.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a new CAPTCHA design principle to distinguish hu-
man (Typer) from human (user). We first pursue a comprehensive analysis of the
Typer phenomenon and the attack mechanism of CAPTCHA. Then we propose
our design principle. That is we should leverage the information asymmetry to
break the same verification connection for the malicious industry and the Typer.
The intuition behind our proposed principle is that different users should share
different information with the server and the challenge processes should include
this information.
We then formalize, design and implement an example on our principle. A novel
generation algorithm for CAPTCHA has been proposed to add the capability
of human error tolerance and the difficulty of random guess attack. After the
evaluation, both the usability and the security study show a close, if not better,
result than the state-of-the-art of CAPTCHA method. The Typer can only deploy
a random guess attack with a very low success rate, while a legitimate user can
solve the CAPTCHA by humans accurately within less than 15 seconds. The result
demonstrates that our proposal meets both security and usability requirements for
a good CAPTCHA design.
As a framework of CAPTCHA, the two examples are just used to demonstrate
how our proposal solves the Typer problems. In the future, we can either reduce
the distortions of the characters and the number of alternatives or find a more
appropriate mapping method to improve the usability and the user experience.
If our examples get cracked, a new scheme may appear following our core idea.
By this principle, the CAPTCHA can have such a capacity to distinguish a hu-
man from another human by attaching the user’s private information to avoid the
crowdsourcing human labors working in the field who are cheating on CAPTCHA.
References
[1] Greg E Blonder. Graphical password, September 24 1996. US Patent 5,559,961.
[2] Elie Bursztein, Steven Bethard, Celine Fabry, John C Mitchell, and Dan Jurafsky.
How good are humans at solving captchas? a large scale evaluation. In Security and
Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on, pages 399–413. IEEE, 2010.
15
[3] Kumar Chellapilla, Kevin Larson, Patrice Simard, and Mary Czerwinski. Designing
human friendly human interaction proofs (hips). In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human factors in computing systems, pages 711–720. ACM, 2005.
[4] Rachna Dhamija and Adrian Perrig. De´ja` vu-a user study: Using images for au-
thentication. In USENIX Security Symposium, volume 9, pages 4–4, 2000.
[5] Jeremy Elson, John R Douceur, Jon Howell, and Jared Saul. Asirra: a captcha
that exploits interest-aligned manual image categorization. In ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, volume 7, pages 366–374. Citeseer, 2007.
[6] Haichang Gao, Jeff Yan, Fang Cao, Zhengya Zhang, Lei Lei, Mengyun Tang, Ping
Zhang, Xin Zhou, Xuqin Wang, and Jiawei Li. A simple generic attack on text
captchas. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). The
Internet Society.
[7] Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, and Stuart Stubblebine. Secure distributed human
computation. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce,
pages 155–164. ACM, 2005.
[8] Rich Gossweiler, Maryam Kamvar, and Shumeet Baluja. What’s up captcha?: a
captcha based on image orientation. In Proceedings of the 18th international con-
ference on World wide web, pages 841–850. ACM, 2009.
[9] Ran Halprin. Dependent captchas: Preventing the relay attack. Weizmann Institute
of Science, 2009.
[10] Andrej Karpathy and Li Fei-Fei. Deep visual-semantic alignments for generating
image descriptions. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition, pages 3128–3137, 2015.
[11] Manar Mohamed, Song Gao, Nitesh Saxena, and Chengcui Zhang. Dynamic cog-
nitive game captcha usability and detection of streaming-based farming. In the
Workshop on Usable Security (USEC), co-located with NDSS, 2014.
[12] Manar Mohamed, Niharika Sachdeva, Michael Georgescu, Song Gao, Nitesh Saxena,
Chengcui Zhang, Ponnurangam Kumaraguru, Paul C van Oorschot, and Wei-Bang
Chen. A three-way investigation of a game-captcha: automated attacks, relay attacks
and usability. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM symposium on Information, computer
and communications security, pages 195–206. ACM, 2014.
[13] Marti Motoyama, Kirill Levchenko, Chris Kanich, Damon McCoy, Geoffrey M
Voelker, and Stefan Savage. Re: Captchas-understanding captcha-solving services
in an economic context. In USENIX Security Symposium, volume 10, page 3, 2010.
[14] J. Nielsen. Usability 101: Introduction to usability, 2012.
[15] Margarita Osadchy, Julio C Hernandez-Castro, Stuart J Gibson, Orr Dunkelman,
and Daniel Perez-Cabo. No bot expects the deepcaptcha! introducing immutable
adversarial examples, with applications to captcha generation. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, 2017.
[16] Steven A Ross, J Alex Halderman, and Adam Finkelstein. Sketcha: a captcha based
on line drawings of 3d models. In Proceedings of the 19th international conference
on World wide web, pages 821–830. ACM, 2010.
[17] Amalia Rusu and Venu Govindaraju. Handwritten captcha: Using the difference in
the abilities of humans and machines in reading handwritten words. In Frontiers in
Handwriting Recognition, 2004. IWFHR-9 2004. Ninth International Workshop on,
pages 226–231. IEEE, 2004.
[18] Erkam Uzun, Simon Pak Ho Chung, Irfan Essa, and Wenke Lee. rtcaptcha: A real-
time captcha based liveness detection system. In Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS). The Internet Society, 2018.
16
[19] Luis Von Ahn, Manuel Blum, Nicholas J Hopper, and John Langford. Captcha:
Using hard ai problems for security. In International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 294–311. Springer, 2003.
[20] Luis Von Ahn and Laura Dabbish. Labeling images with a computer game. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems,
pages 319–326. ACM, 2004.
[21] Luis Von Ahn, Benjamin Maurer, Colin McMillen, David Abraham, and Manuel
Blum. recaptcha: Human-based character recognition via web security measures.
Science, 321(5895):1465–1468, 2008.
[22] Te-En Wei, Albert B Jeng, and Hahn-Ming Lee. Geocaptcha: A novel personalized
captcha using geographic concept to defend against 3 rd party human attack. In
Performance Computing and Communications Conference (IPCCC), 2012 IEEE
31st International, pages 392–399. IEEE, 2012.
[23] Wikipedia. Post (http), 2018.
[24] Yi Xu, Gerardo Reynaga, Sonia Chiasson, Jan-Michael Frahm, Fabian Monrose, and
Paul C van Oorschot. Security and usability challenges of moving-object captchas:
Decoding codewords in motion. In USENIX security symposium, pages 49–64, 2012.
[25] Quan-Bin Ye, Te-En Wei, Albert B Jeng, Hahn-Ming Lee, and Kuo-Ping Wu. Ddim-
captcha: A novel drag-n-drop interactive masking captcha against the third party
human attacks. In Technologies and Applications of Artificial Intelligence (TAAI),
2013 Conference on, pages 158–163. IEEE, 2013.
[26] Bin B Zhu, Jeff Yan, Guanbo Bao, Maowei Yang, and Ning Xu. Captcha as graphical
passwordsa new security primitive based on hard ai problems. IEEE transactions
on information forensics and security, 9(6):891–904, 2014.
17
